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NOTE
MORATORIUM ON SCHOOL BUSING FOR THE PURPOSE OF
ACHIEVING RACIAL BALANCE: A NEW CHAPTER IN
CONGRESSIONAL COURT-CURBING
I. Introduction
On June 23, 1972, the Education Amendments of 1972' were signed into law.
The Amendments constitute the first piece of federal legislation designed, at least
in part,2 to curb federal court reliance upon busing of school children to achieve
racial balance.' While the legislation was less stringent than the President desired4
and was criticized by many for its impotency,5. it sounded the opening shot in the
newest battle between the courts and Congress in a war that began with the
Brown6 decision of 1954.
This note will examine antibusing legislation and consider whether Congress
has the power to suspend court-ordered busing of school children while con-
templating ways to deal with a problem of national concern. The article will
1 Pub. L. No. 92-318 (June 23, 1972).
2 While the Education Amendments of 1972 are primarily concerned with financial
assistance for higher education, §§ 801-06 relate specifically to transportation of students as a
means of overcoming racial imbalance.
3 The central provision relating to court-ordered busing is § 803 which states:
Notwithstanding any other law or provision of law, in the case of any order on the
part of any United States district court which requires the transfer or transportation
of any student or students from any school attendance area prescribed by competent
State or local authority for -the purposes of achieving a balance among students with
respect to race, sex, religion, or socioeconomic status, the effectiveness of such order
shall be postponed until all appeals in connection with such order have been ex-
hausted or, in the event no appeals are taken, until the time for such appeals has
expired. (Emphasis added.)
4 Prior to the enactment of the Education Amendments of 1972, the President requested
congressional passage of two measures. His proposed Student Transportation Moratorium Act,
S. 3388, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972) would bar all new court-ordered busing in the short run,
while the Equal Educational Opportunities Act, S. 3395, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972) would
permanently prohibit student transportation except where it was the only remedy by which
dual school systems might be desegregated. Special Message from President Nixon submitted
to Congress on Busing and Equality of Educational Opportunity, H.R. Doc. No. 195, 92d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
5 Several congressmen have expressed dissatisfaction with the legislation and have prom-
ised their support to future enactments which place stronger restraints upon court-ordered
busing. See, e.g., 118 CoNo. Rc. 8376 (daily ed. May 24, 1972) (remarks of Senator Byrd);
id. at 8385 (remarks of Senator Stennis); id. at 8377 (remarks of Senator Allen). The criti-
cism centers around three areas: 1) the act does not prevent federal courts from ordering
busing for desegregation purposes but merely postpones implementation of such orders; 2)
under § 802 (a) local school districts are still allowed to request federal financial assistance for
busing purposes; consequently, federal district courts could order the transportation of students
and force such districts to request the funds or be held in contempt; 3) the act discriminates
against the many school districts which have already implemented desegregation plans involv-
ing the busing of students.
6 347 U.S. 483 (1954). In the now-familiar Brown decision the Court declared that so-
called "separate but equal" educational facilities deprive minority students of the educational
opportunities afforded to majority children thereby denying minority students so situated the
equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment. One year later the
Court implemented its 1954 decision by requiring the dissipation of dual educational systems
"with all deliberate speed," Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955), and by
compelling the lower federal courts "to consider whether the action of school authorities con-
stitutes good faith implementation of the governing constitutional principles." Id. at 299.
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also analyze related issues as to separation of powers, congressional authority
under article III of the Constitution and section five of the fourteenth amend-
ment, judicial review, and the history of congressional-judicial confrontations-all
in an attempt to determine whether such student transportation enactments can
withstand the test of constitutionality.
II. Grounds for Congression al Attacks Upon the Judiciary
Congress has several grounds upon which to premise an attack upon the
judiciary and has either employed or seriously considered all of them over the one
hundred eighty-three year history of the Constitution.7 The architects of the Con-
stitution emphatically urged a system of checks and balances whereby each of
the federal branches might command certain controls over the others in order to
keep each within the functional boundaries prescribed for it." The proddings of
the framers came to fruition in the Constitution itself,' and the document is thus
fitted with provisions that allow the national legislature to curb the federal courts
to at least a limited extent.
A. Article III
The major flaw in the armor of the judiciary is article III of the Constitu-
tion, the source of most congressional attacks upon the courts. This article vests
the national judicial power "in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts
as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish." (Emphasis
added.)"0 From the earliest interpretations of this section in the decisions of the
Supreme Court, it has been a commonly accepted maxim that the jurisdiction of
all inferior federal tribunals depends entirely upon the authority of Congress.
Relevant cases have consistently relegated the lower federal courts to plenary
congressional control and have continually proclaimed the national legislature's
7 For a history of congressional attacks upon the Supreme Court, see generally W.
MURPHY, CONGRESS AND THE COURT (1962); C. PRITCHETT, CONGRESS VERSUS THE STY-
PRE=E COURT 3-31 (1961); R. HIRSCHFIELD, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE COURT 22-60
(1962); Elliott, Court-Curbing Proposals in Congress, 33 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 597 (1958).
8 James Madison bespoke the mood of the Constitutional Convention as regards checks
and balances when he stated:
[U]nless [the legislative, executive, and judiciary] departments be so far con-
nected and blended as to give each a constitutional control over the others, the degree
of separation which the maxim [of separation of powers] requires, as essential to a
free government, can never in practice be duly maintained.
It is agreed on all sides that the powers properly belonging to one of the depart-
ments ought not to be directly and completely administered by either of the other
departments. It is equally evident that none of them ought to possess, directly or
indirectly, an overruling influence over the others in the administration of their
respective powers. It will not be denied that power is of an encroaching nature and
that it ought to be effectually restrained from passing the limits assigned to it. After
discriminating, therefore, in theory, the several classes of power, as they may in their
nature be legislative, executive, or judiciary, the next and most difficult task is to
provide some practical security for each, against the invasion of the others. THE
FEDERALIST No. 48, at 308 (Mentor ec 1961) (J. Madison).
9 For example, under the Constitution, the Supreme Court is able to check both the
President and Congress by reviewing the constitutionality of their actions. The legislative and
executive branches may also check the judiciary's power. The President may do so by means of
his law enforcement powers and Congress by way of limiting the Court's appellate jurisdiction.
10 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
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right to create and abolish them." The 1845 case of Gary v. Curtis2 typifies the
Court's approach:
[T]he judicial power of the United States, although it has its origin in the
Constitution, is (except in enumerated instances, applicable exclusively to
this court) dependent for its distribution and organization, and for the
modes of its exercise, entirely upon the action of Congress, who possess the
sole power of creating the tribunals (inferior to the Supreme Court) for the
exercise of the judicial power, and of investing them with jurisdiction either
limited, concurrent, or exclusive, and of withholding jurisdiction from them
in the exact degrees and character which to Congress may seem proper for
the public good.. . [T]he organization of the judicial power, the definition
and distribution of the subjects of jurisdiction in the federal tribunals, and
the modes of their action and authority, have been, and of right must be,
the work of the legislature.' 3
Almost one hundred years later the Court cited Cary V. Curtis when it stated:
All federal courts, other than the Supreme Court, derive their jurisdiction
wholly from the exercise of the authority to "ordain and establish" inferior
courts, conferred on Congress by Article III, § 1, of the Constitution. Article
III left Congress free to establish inferior federal courts or not as it thought
appropriate. It could have declined to create any such courts .... 11
Since 1796, the Supreme Court has suggested that according to article III,
section 2 of the Constitution its own jurisdiction is likewise subject to unlimited
congressional control. This section is commonly referred to as the "exceptions
and regulations" clause and in addition to delineating the scope of judicial power
it proclaims that:
In al cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and
those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have original
Jurisdiction. In all other Cases ... the supreme Court shall have appellate
Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions and under such
Regulations as the Congress shall make. (Emphasis added.) '-
Congressional court-curbing capabilities, as derived from the "exceptions and
regulations" clause, have been augmented by the Supreme Court itself 6 since the
Court has placed a strict interpretation upon article III." Some analysts claim
11 Cary v. Curtis, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 265, 276-77 (1845); Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8
How.) 453, 461-62 (1850); Lauf v. E. G. Shinner & Co., 303 U.S. 323, 330 (1937); Lockerty
v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182, 187 (1943).
12 44 U.S. (3 How.) 265 (1845).
13 Id. at 276-77.
14 Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182, 187 (1943).
15 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
16 See Wiscart v. D'Auchy, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 253, 259 (1796); Turner v. Bank of North
America, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 7, 9 n.a (1799); United States v. More, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 96, 104(1805); Durousseau v. United States, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 177, 180 (1810); McNulty v.
Batty, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 77, 84 (1850); Daniels v. Railroad Company, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.)
250 (1869); Gordon v. United States, 117 U.S. 697, 699-701, 705 (1885).
17 Several articles have dealt with the congressional power to limit the appellate jurisdic-
tion of the federal courts and the Supreme Court in particular. Among the most noteworthy
are Ratner, Congressional Power Over the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 109
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that the Court's own interpretation provides a basis for denying all appellate
jurisdiction,"8 but most see limits beyond which Congress cannot go. 9 The
ultimate perimeters of Congress' article III power will be discussed later. Of
immediate importance, however, is the fact that the Court's own interpretation
of the clause tends to support attempts by Congress to limit or deny jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court.
The first case to examine the powers of Congress under article III, section 2
was Wiscart v. D'Auchy0 where it was concluded that the appellate jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court is limited because it is given "with such Exceptions and
under such Regulations as Congress shall make."'n The Court further stated that
it cannot exercise appellate jurisdiction unless Congress has provided a rule to
regulate such proceedings. Where a rule is provided, the Court "cannot depart
from it."2
2
Three years following the Wiscart decision, the Court made its position even
clearer when in Turner v. Bank of North Americda3 it noted that:
The notion has frequently been entertained, that the federal courts derive
their judicial power immediately from the constitution; but the political
truth is, that the disposal of the judicial power (except in a few specified
instances) belongs to congress. If congress has given the power to this court,
we possess it, not otherwise .... 24
Subsequent decisions were in accord with the Turner view?5
U. PA. L. REv. 157 (1960); Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the jurisdiction of Federal
Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARv. L. REv. 1362 (1953); Lenoir, Congressional Control
Over the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 5 KANSAS L. R!v. 16 (1956); Halper,
Supreme Court Responses to Congressional Threats: Strategy and Tactics, 19 DRAKE L. REv.
292 (1970).
18 For example, former Supreme Court Justice Roberts concluded that according to the
language and judicial interpretation of article III there is nothing to prevent Congress from
removing all of the Supreme Court's jurisdiction. Roberts, Now Is the Time: Fortifying the
Supreme Court's Independence, 35 A.B.AJ. 1 (1949).
19 See, e.g., articles cited supra note 17.
20 3 U.S. (3 Dal.) 253 (1796).
21 Id. at 257.
22 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 258. Justice Marshall referred to Wiscart v. D'Auchy in a later
case and expressed the view that where Congress makes no regulation with respect to the
Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction the Court has complete jurisdiction by virtue of its
constitutional grant. United States v. More, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 96, 104 (1805); accord,
Durousseau v. United States, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 177, 180 (1810). It should be noted, how-
ever, that this statement was dictum and that it only applied where there was a complete
absence of congressional regulation. Since that situation has never existed the case is barely
distinguishable from the original Wiscart view and Marshall would certainly revert to the
Wiscart rationale once Congress acted at all. Lenoir, supra note 17.
23 4 U.S. (4 Dull.) 7 (1799).
24 Id. at 9, n.a.
25 See Durousseau v. United States, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 177, 181 (1810):
The appellate powers of this court are not given by the judicial act. They are given
by the constitution. But they are limited and regulated by the judicial act, and by
such other acts as have been passed on the subject.
See also United States v. More, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 96, 104 (1805); Daniels v. Railroad Com-
pany, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 250, 254 (1865), where two prerequisites were established by the
Court for the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction:
In order to create [appellate] jurisdiction in any case, two things must concur: the
Constitution must give the capacity to take it, and an act of Congress must supply
the requisite authority.
The original jurisdiction of this court, and its power to receive appellate jurisdic-
tion, are created and defined by the Constitution; and the legislative department of
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In McNulty u. Batty" the Court concluded (from the fact that it could not
exercise appellate jurisdiction unless conferred upon it by a congressional act) that
if an act conferring jurisdiction expires, the jurisdiction ceases also, even where
an appeal is pending in the Court at that time.2  From this, it might be deduced
that an act conferring jurisdiction can also be retracted thereby denying the
jurisdiction which previously existed.
Such a retraction occurred in 1868 and the nation's highest court responded
with its furthest concession to congressional control. Ex parte McCardle8 saw
a petitioner bring his habeas corpus petition before the Supreme Court, which at
the time had authorization to grant such relief under a congressional act passed
in 1867. After argument was heard, but prior to the Court's decision, Congress
passed the Act of March 27, 1868, repealing the portions of the 1867 act which
conferred habeas corpus jurisdiction upon the Court.29 The Court then dismissed
the case, proclaiming, in part:
We are not at liberty to inquire into the motives of the legislature. We can
only examine into its powers under the Constitution; and the power to make
exceptions to the appellate jurisdiction of this court is given by express
words."0
In its strictest sense, Ex parte McCardle has been viewed as acknowledging the
existence of a congressional power to thwart the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court merely by passing legislation which withdraws the Court's
authority to review any particular pending case.3 This interpretation could have
drastic consequences should Congress attempt to forestall court-ordered busing by
means of its article III powers.
B. Other Grounds
Aside from constitutional control over the federal judiciary, Congress has
several other means for conducting an assault on the courts.3 2 Impeachments, 3
constitutional amendments, 4 and legislative reversals of judicial rulings9 highlight
the government can enlarge neither one nor the other. But it is for Congress to deter-
mine how far, within the limits of the capacity of this court to take, appellate jurisdic-
tion shall be given, and when conferred, it can be exercised only to the extent and
in the manner prescribed by law. In these respects it is wholly the creature of legisla-
tion. Id. at 254.
26 51 U.S. (10 How.) 77 (1850).
27 Id. at 84.
28 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869).
29 For a history of events leading up to the McCardle decision see W. MURPHY, CONORESS
AND THE COURT 37-8 (1962); Ratner, supra note 17, at 180; Tweed, Provisions of the Con-
stitution Concerning the Supreme Court of the United States, 31 B.U. L. Rav. 1, 21-2 (1951).
30 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 514.
31 Ratner, supra note 17 at 180.
32 Several treatises and articles have enumerated congressional tools used to attack the
Court. See, e.g., C. PRITCHETT supra note 7, at 25-6; R. HmseHFiELD, supra note 7, at 22;
Halper, supra note 17.
33 A case in point is the attempted impeachment of justice Chase early in the nineteenth
century in response to what Jeffersonians considered Federalist abuse of the judicial office.
See generally 1 WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATEs HISTORY (1922).
34 Several constitutional amendments have been proposed and, of these, many have been
rather broad in their scope. One such proposal, for example, sought to provide a procedure
[October, 19721
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the restless history of American justice. The methods most frequently suggested
and employed are the article III powers already discussed and manipulation of
the number and qualifications of justices sitting on the various federal benches."
III. Congressional Court-Curbing: A Historical View
The current attack on the federal judiciary draws much of its strength from
the resources just described. Before proceeding to a more detailed discussion of
antibusing proposals, however, it will be helpful to recount some of the more
conspicuous congressional-judicial conflicts of the past.
The first major confrontation occurred at the beginning of the nineteenth
century and has become familiar history to students of constitutional law. In the
elections of 1800 the reins of government were wrested from the powerful Fed-
eralists by Thomas Jefferson and his Republican Party. Nevertheless, in the
interim between the election and actual passage of political control, the Fed-
eralists devised a scheme to perpetuate their influence on the national government.
Their plan included the enactment of the Judiciary Act of 1801 which doubled
the number of federal judgeships and the appointment of several "lame duck"
judges to fill the newly created posts. The legislation infuriated the recently
elected Republicans, and they refused to deliver several commissions that re-
mained unpresented when the Federalists left office. When the Supreme Court
granted an order to show cause why mandamus requiring delivery of the com-
missions should not be issued, however, the Republicans introduced a bill to repeal
the Act of 1801. After it passed the Republican legislature took an even more
radical step. Realizing that the repealer's constitutionality would be questioned
by the Court and desiring to postpone such an inevitability, an additional bill was
introduced and passed which abolished the June and December Supreme Court
terms (created by the Act of 1801) and restored the old February term but not
the August term. This legislative ploy forced adjournment of the Court for
fourteen months."
When the Court reconvened, Chief Justice Marshall announced the famous
whereby Congress could limit the Supreme Court's authority to find federal or state statutes
unconstitutional by a two-thirds vote of each house. H.R.J. Res. 476, 85th Cong., 2d Sess.(1958). Another would have reserved to the states exclusive jurisdiction over "interference
with or limitation upon the power of any State to regulate health, morals, education, marriage,
and good order in the State." H.R.J. Res. 175, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957). The most com-
mon proposal would require an extraordinary majority in the Supreme Court in order to declare
an act of Congress unconstitutional. See generally W. MURPHY, CONGREss AND THE COURT
50 (1962).
On several occasions more modest constitutional amendments have been proposed seeking
merely to overturn certain decisions rather than to directly attack the Court. The l1th amend-
ment reversed Chisholn v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 363 (1793). The 13th and 14th
amendments in part reversed Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). And
the 16th amendment reversed Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601 (1895).
Halper, supra note 17 at 309.
35 See, e.g., Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1970).
36 See note 7, supra. Other seldom used tools of judicial control have been proposed. Such
things as the election of federal judges, experience requirements, and denial of funds to the
courts have all been considered by the Congress. The "case or controversy" formula of article
III and the notion of judicial self-restraint have also moderated judicial independence. See
R. HmscHrFLD, supra note 7, at 22. W. MURPHY, CONGRESS AND THE COURT 2 (1962).
37 1 WARREN, THE SuPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 206-65 (1922).
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Marbury v. Madison"8 decision which effectively ended the first battle between
Congress and the Court. 9 To the surprise of the Republicans, he declared un-
constitutional the statute under which the mandamus had been issued,40 thereby
eliminating the main point of confrontation. While the opinion set forth a rule
of law outwardly favoring the opponents of the judiciary, it had successfully
asserted the Court's power to adjudicate the constitutionality of congressional
enactments. The Supreme Court thus emerged from its first confrontation with
Congress stronger and more independent than before.
Four more major attacks were launched against the Court prior to the
present busing dispute. The most vigorous battles were fought during the Civil
War period and the Progressive (1920's), New Deal (1930's), and Warren
Court (1950-60's) eras. 1
The Civil War confrontation began with the Dred Scott" decision but did
not reach its peak until the war had ended and "reconstruction" had begun.
Under the. post-Civil War Reconstruction Acts, military governments were
congressionally imposed on many of the former Confederate States. McCardle,
a Mississippi newspaper editor, was placed in military custody for publishing
certain pro-southern articles. By invoking the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, which
authorized use of the writ by anyone restrained "in violation of the Constitution"
and provided for appeals to the Supreme Court, McCardle's attorney brought his
case before the Court. The Court noted jurisdiction of the appeal in January,
1868, with a hearing set for March of that year. Radicals in Congress who
desired to continue military rule in the South feared that the Court might use the
McCardle petition to strike down all "reconstruction" enactments and they passed
a bill repealing, in part, the Act of 1867. Despite the fact that arguments had
already been heard, the Court postponed its decision of the case until the repealing
act took effect4" and twelve months later concluded that its jurisdiction had been
removed by the latter act.44 The opinion noted that review of habeas corpus
petitions could still be had in other federal tribunals as well as the Supreme
Court itself if brought there originally,4" but Congress had unquestionably won
the day.
The 1920's provided the setting for the next major congressional assault.
38 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 87 (1803).
39 See W. MURPHY, CONGRESS AND THE COURT 8-12 (1962) [hereinafter cited as
MURPHY].
40 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 111.
41 The interim periods between the major confrontations were not altogether peaceful. For
example, three court-controlling measures were suggested in Congress around 1820. One would
have given the Senate appellate jurisdiction over the Supreme Court; another would have
required an extraordinary majority of the Court to declare a statute unconstitutional; and a
third would have modified the Judiciary Act. MURPHY, supra note 39, at 21-7. Later, between
1821 and 1882, at least ten bills to deprive the Court of its appellate jurisdiction were intro-
duced. Halper, supra note 17, at 307.
42 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857) held, in effect, that Negro
Americans were not considered citizens. The decision prompted severe criticism by northern
senators and by Lincoln himself, and several court-curbing measures were proposed. The most
radical was submitted by Senator Hole of New Hampshire who called for an entire new Supreme
Court. MURPHY, supra note 39, at 31.
43 MURPHY, supra note 39, at 37-8. See also note 29 supra.
44 Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869).
45 Id. at 515.
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"Progressives" led by Senator Robert La Follette of Wisconsin were pushing
for more government regulation of business when, in 1922 and 1923, the federal
judiciary struck several blows to such regulatory legislation."8 Congress responded
in what had become a typical manner. The usual variety of "extraordinary
majority" amendments appeared as well as those which would allow congressional
reversal of judicial decisions by a two-thirds vote in each house of the national
legislature."7 La Follette himself suggested a program by which inferior federal
judges would not be allowed to declare congressional enactments unconstitutional.
In addition, where the Supreme Court found an act unconstitutional, Congress
would have the option to repass the legislation and thus nullify the decision.
Despite the severity of the "Progressive Era" attack, the Court issue died in 1924
-when the "Progressives" were defeated at the polls.
Perhaps the most famous attack on the judiciary came during the 1930's
when President Roosevelt challenged a Supreme Court which had become an
obstruction to his "New Deal" legislation. When his program to lift the nation out
of the depression became seriously threatened by a conservative Supreme Court,
the President had three alternatives with which to neutralize the antagonistic
tribunal: 1) limitation of its reviewing power by a constitutional amendment;
2) statutory restriction of its appellate jurisdiction in certain areas; and 3) an
increase in the number of Supreme Court justices by an act of Congress. The
first alternative would take too long and Roosevelt feared that the Court would
strike down the second on constitutional grounds. He chose the third, therefore,
and sent his now-familiar "court-packing" plan to Congress.4" There the response
was mixed. Many legislators considered the scheme an infringement upon the
powers of the Supreme Court and the majority apparently desired both an in-
dependent tribunal and the "New Deal." The conflict was resolved when the
attitude of the Court itself mellowed. The Court's retreat became complete with
the decision of National Labor Relations Board v. Tones & Laughlin Steel Corp.
where the Court upheld the National Labor Relations Act."° Following that
decision the "court-packing" plan was dropped.
The current busing dispute is only the latest development in a battle which
began with the Brown decision in 1954. Once the Supreme Court truly entered
the race relations arena 5 it became the object of tremendous congressional pres-
sure, especially from southern senators. When the Court handed down several
46 United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895); Swift and Company v. United
States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905).
47 Note 34 supra.
48 MURPHY, supra note 39, at 50.
49 The plan Roosevelt sent to Congress called for the voluntary retirement of justices at
age 70. If a justice failed to retire he could remain in office but the President would then have
the power to appoint an additional member. R. HImsc ELD, supra note 7, at 45.
50 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
51 While Brown was the first case to characterize segregated facilities, even where equal,
as a violation of the fourteenth amendment, cases prior to the 1954 decision indicated that the
Court was prepared to decide questions in the race relations area. See, e.g., Sweatt v. Painter,
339 U.S. 629 (1950) where the Court applied the "separate but equal" rule and held that a
Negro law school in Texas was not "equal" to the University of Texas Law School. See also
McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950).
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decisions viewed as sympathetic to communists the stage was set for the most
severe attack yet.52
The siege began in 1955 when Representative Smith of Virginia, a staunch
conservative and segregationist,5" introduced a states' rights bill." It reached its
peak in 1957 when Senator Jenner of Indiana introduced a bill invoking
Congress' powers under article III of the Constitution and calling for removal of
the federal courts' authority to review certain classes of cases.5
Hearings brought out both proponents and opponents of the bill," and
some, including Senator Thurmond of South Carolina, proposed additional re-
strictions while supporting the Jenner proposal. In addition to the classes of cases
enumerated by the Jenner bill, Thurmond and others" sought to remove federal
appellate jurisdiction over cases dealing with school litigation.
Opposition to the Jenner bill originated in several quarters. Senate liberals
were in clear discord with the provisions as were the Justice Department58 and
many lawyers and law professors.59 In the face of this resistance Senator Jenner
joined forces with Senator Butler and modified the bill so as to avoid almost
certain defeat. In its Jenner-Butler form it met with success in the Judiciary Com-
mittee and eventually passed the House in 1958." But Senate liberals opposed the
Jenner bill even in its modified form, considering it "part of a 'reverse the Court'
campaign which [stemmed] largely . .. from the earlier decision in the Brown
case."
68
Due to maneuvers by the Senate Majority Leader, Lyndon Johnson, the bill
52 See note 64 infra. For a historical analysis of the congressional-judicial conflict of the
1950's see generally Elliott, Court-Curbing Proposals in Congress, supra note 7; C. PRITCIRETT,
supra note 7; MURPHY, supra note 39.
53 MuRPHY, supra note 39, at 91.
54 H.R. 3, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955).
55 S. 2646, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957). See also the House version of S. 2646: H.R.
9207, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957).
The Jenner proposal would have stripped the Supreme Court of appellate jurisdiction:
... over all cases involving the validity of: 1) Contempt proceedings against wit-
nesses before congressional committees; 2) dismissal of government employees on
security grounds; 3) state laws for the control of subversive activities; 4) regulations
relating to subversive activities of public school teachers; and 5) state requirements
for the admission to the practice of law.
56 Hearings on the Limitations of Appellate Jurisdiction of the United States Supreme
Court Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the judiciary, 85th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess.
(1958).
57 Other bills concerned with judicial jurisdiction over public school disputes were sug-
gested by two South Carolina congressmen. In 1957, Representative Rivers submitted legisla-
tion that would preclude federal court jurisdiction over any action involving the validity of
state provisions relating to public schools. H.R. 1228, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957). Similarly,
Senator Johnston of South Carolina proposed a bill to deprive the Supreme Court of appellate
jurisdiction "in any case wherein the action of a state concerning its public schools is attacked
on grounds other than substantial inequality of physical facilities and other tangible factors."
S. 3467, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958).
58 The Justice Department suggested that the bill be shelved. Attorney General Rogers
himself described the Jenner bill as a "retaliatory measure" which threatened the judiciary's
independence. MURPHY, supra note 39, at 161.
59 Most of the law schools and lawyers contacted clearly opposed the bill. Dean O'Meara
of Notre Dame Law School termed the bill "vicious." The University of Alabama Law School
deemed the proposal "unwise." Id.
60 In 1958 segregationists were once again calling for strong congressional action to curb
the Court. See, e.g., 104 CONG. REc. 2330 (1958) (remarks of Congressman Colmer). 1958
also saw the resurgence of the more stringent Smith bill, H.R. 3. MURPHY, supra note 39,
at 172.
61 104 CONG. Rac. 18693 (1958) (remarks of Senator Douglas).
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never came to a vote in the Senate and the legislative session adjourned with the
Warren Court surviving the onslaught.8 2 Things were nevertheless far from
peaceful for the Court. Only four days after adjournment the tribunal was
called into, special session due to school desegregation problems in Little Rock,
Arkansas. In unanimously denying the Little Rock School Board's request for a
temporary return to segregation, the Court unflinchingly asserted its authority.
Chief Justice Warren wrote for the Court:
Article VI of the Constitution makes the Constitution the "supreme
Law of the Land." In 1803, Chief Justice Marshall ... declared in the
notable case of Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177, that "It is emphati-
cally the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law
is." This decision declared the basic principle that the federal judiciary is
supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution, and that principle
has ever since been respected by this Court and the Country as a permanent
and indispensable feature of our constitutional system. It follows that the
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment enunciated by this Court in
the Brown case is the supreme law of the land, and Art. VI of the Constitu-
tion makes it of binding effect on the States .... 6s
Despite the Chief Justice's assertive statement, the Court was notably less
aggressive beginning with the 1958 term and actually withdrew from some of the
earlier positions which proved so unpopular with a large segment of Congress."
As a result, when Congress reconvened, the fire of the past session was gone and
the conflict between the Warren Court and Congress had followed the well-
worn path of judicial decision, legislative reaction, judicial retreat, and then,
quiescence.m " It is important to note, however, that the Court's withdrawal oc-
curred after the threat of retaliatory legislation had practically passed" and
further that there was not the slightest retreat from the desegregation decisions.
IV. The New Attack: A Congressional Roadblock to Court-ordered Busing
By standing firm on its desegregation policies, the Warren Court assured
itself a precarious peace at best, and though the 1960's remained relatively
tranquil" the battle was to be renewed over the most divisive domestic issue of
the 1970's---court-ordered busing of school children for purposes of racial balance.
62 Murphy, in his treatise on Congress and the Court, concluded that anti-court legislation
would surely have passed the 85th Congress had -the proponents been satisfied with the less
restrictive acts. However, by pushing the stricter court-curbing legislation they came into con-
flict with Senator Johnson. The powerful majority leader opposed the legislation because he
feared it would contain a number of anti-desegregation amendments. MuRPHy, suprz note
39, at 172.
63 Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958).
64 The Court was heavily criticized for several decisions allegedly displaying permissiveness
toward "communists": Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958); Watkins v. United States, 354
U.S. 178 (1957); and Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957). Two cases retreated
from the more permissive view and thereby relieved much of the pressure on the Court. Baren-
blatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959); Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72 (1959).
65 Elliott, supra note 7.
66 Halper, supra note 17.
67 The Court did come under some pressure in 1964 when legislation was proposed in
reaction to the reapportionment cases of Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) and Reynolds v.
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A. Proposed Legislation
After several attempts in Congress early in 1972 to prevent court-ordered
busing,6" President Nixon presented a special message to Congress officially
renewing the attack on the federal courts' school desegregation decisions. 9 In his.
address he criticized busing orders in lower federal courts, stating they had led
to inconsistency, contradiction, uncertainty, and unequal treatment and, further,
that they had gone beyond what is reasonable and necessary.
Accompanying the communication was proposed legislation which by
design would have a two-pronged effect: 1) it would bar all new judicially im-
posed transportation orders until July 1, 1973, or until Congress enacted ap-
propriate remedial legislation;"0 and 2) it would permanently limit remedies
available to federal courts charged with the elimination of dual school systems."
The latter effect would be achieved by the Equal Educational Opportunities
Act which, in addition to concentrating school-aid funds in areas of greatest need,
would establish priorities among remedies to be used for desegregation of schools,
with busing to be used only as a last resort and then under strict limitations. The
short-run freeze on busing would be accomplished by means of the Student
Transportation Moratorium Act. According to President Nixon this Act would
not contravene fourteenth amendment rights, but simply hold further busing
orders "in abeyance" until Congress has investigated and considered alternative
means to secure those rights. 2 He argued that enactment of his proposed leg-
islation would: 1) put an immediate stop to new busing orders by federal courts;
2) enlist the services of Congress in solving the problems of desegregation; 3)
establish uniform national criteria; 4) protect and maintain neighborhood
Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). Representative Tuck proposed an act to deny the Supreme Court
jurisdiction -
to review the action of a Federal court or a State court of last resort concerning any
action taken upon a petition or complaint seeking to apportion or reapportion any
legislature of any State of the Union or any branch thereof....
The district courts shall not have jurisdiction to entertain any petition or com-
plaint seeking to apportion or reapportion the legislature of any State of the Union
or any branch thereof, nor shall any order or decree of any district or circuit court
now pending and not finally disposed of by actual reapportionment be hereafter
enforced. H.R. 11926, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964).
Senator Dirksen introduced a similar bill which read: Upon application made by
or on behalf of any State or by one or more citizens thereof in any action or proceed-
ing in any court of the United States, or before any justice or judge of the United
States, in which there is placed in question the validity of the composition of either
house of the legislature of that State or the apportionment of the membership thereof,
such action or proceeding shall be stayed until the end of the second regular session
of the legislature of that State which begins after the date of enactment of this section.
S. 3069, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964).
Both the Tuck and Dirksen bills were ultimately eliminated by the Conference Committee.
McKay, Court, Congress, and Reapportionment, 63 MIcH. L. Rnv. 255 (1964).
68 See, e.g., H.R. 13176, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
69 Special Message from President Nixon Submitted to Congress on Busing and Equality
of Educational Opportunity, H.R. Doc. No. 195, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
70 Student Transportation Moratorium Act, S. 3388, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
71 Equal Educational Opportunities Act, S. 3395, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972). See note 6
supra in regard to the duty of federal courts to eliminate dual school systems.
72 Note 69 supra, at 3.
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schools; and 5) still not roll back the Constitution or "undermine the continuing
drive for equal rights."7
Congress responded to the presidential request with less stringent antibusing
provisions than those asked for; nevertheless, President Nixon reluctantly signed
the measures into law. The Education Amendments of 1972, unlike the Ad-
ministration proposals, do not bar federal courts from issuing busing orders.
Instead, they postpone the effectiveness of such orders pending the exhaustion of
related appeals, or, where none are taken, expiration of the time allotted for such
appeals. Section 803 states that district court orders requiring the transportation
of students "for the purpose of achieving a racial balance.., shall be postponed
until all appeals have been exhausted, or... until the time for such appeals has
-expired."' In addition, section 802 (a) of the Act prohibits the use of federal
funds for the transportation of students or teachers "except on the express written
voluntary request of appropriate local school officials" and where the time,
distance of travel, and diminishment of educational opportunities are not un-
reasonable.7 5
B. Reliance Upon the Fourteenth Amendment
Both the presidential and congressional proposals rely in part upon the now-
familiar article III powers for their support. For the first time in the history of
congressional-judicial disputes, however, Congress' powers under the fourteenth
amendment have been enlisted in support of anticourt legislation. During a
news conference in which he explained the Administration proposal, Attorney
General Kleindeinst concluded:
[T]here can be no legitimate doubt whatsoever that, as a result of the power
conferred upon the Congress in Section 5 of the 14th Amendment and also
Article III of the Constitution, [the proposed legislation is constitutional].7 6
This new reliance upon the fourteenth amendment may have been prompted
by the 1966 decision of Katzenbach v. Morgan which adopted a broad new
interpretation of section five of the amendment.
Section five of the fourteenth amendment gives Congress the "power to en-
force, by appropriate legislation" the equal protection and due process require-
73 Id. at 2.
74 See note 3 supra.
75 See. 802 (a). No funds appropriated for the purpose of carrying out any appli-
cable program may be used for the transportation of students or teachers . .. in order
to overcome racial imbalance in any school or school system, or for the transportation
of students or teachers . . . in order to carry out a plan of racial desegregation . . .
except on the express written voluntary request of appropriate local school officials.
No such funds shall be made available for transportation when the time or distance
of travel is so great as 'to risk the health of the children or significantly impinge on
the educational process of such children, or where the educational opportunities
available at the school to which it is proposed that any such student be transported
will be substantially inferior to those opportunities offered at the school to which
such student would otherwise be assigned ....
76 118 CONG. REc. 2881 (daily ed. Mar. 29, 1972). See also note 69 supra, at 2; 118
CONG. R c. 4416 (daily ed. April 28, 1972) (statement by Harvard Law Faculty members
questioning validity of section 5 powers).
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ments of that amendment. In early cases interpreting the section, the Court
reserved for itself the power to declare what acts were forbidden by the fourteenth
amendment. Congress' authority under section five was limited to corrective
legislation." If the Court had not first declared an activity to be in violation of
the amendment, Congress, according to this early interpretation, was powerless
to act. This approach was abandoned in 1966 when Katzenbach V. Morgan 7
was decided. Morgan dealt with the constitutionality of section 4(e) of the
Voting Rights Act of 1965 which requires that persons who have successfully
completed the sixth grade in a Puerto Rican school using a language other than
English for its instruction shall not be denied the right to vote simply because
they cannot read or write English. Such a requirement was defended by the
attorney general of New York State on the grounds that section 4(e) was un-
constitutional since congressional power under the fourteenth amendment can
only be employed after the judicial branch has determined that there has been
a violation of the amendment. 9
The Court rejected this argument, stating that neither the language nor
history of section five supported that construction" and adopted a broad new
interpretation of the section:
Correctly viewed, § 5 is a positive grant of legislative power authorizing
Congress to exercise its discretion in determining whether and what legisla-
tion is needed to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.81
Under this interpretation, the Court saw no need to find the New York act in
violation of the fourteenth amendment, but was satisfied that it was "able to
perceive a basis" upon which Congress could have determined that a denial of
rights existed.82 Therefore, the fact that the tribunal itself had found a North
Carolina literacy provision constitutional in Lassiter v. Northampton Election
Bd." was considered inapposite.84 The Court concluded that legislation should
be upheld as long as it meets the two conditions devised by Justice Marshall to
determine the reach of the "necessary and proper" powers of Congress: 85 1)
the enactment must be adapted to and appropriate for the enforcement of the
fourteenth amendment; and 2) it must be consistent with the "letter and spirit
of the Constitution.""
Justice Harlan dissented, arguing that if Congress is permitted, by virtue
of its powers under section five, to overrule Lassiter and to expand the sub-
stantive scope of the fourteenth amendment, there would be nothing to prevent
77 See, e.g., Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883). See also Note, Fourteenth Amend-
ment Enforcement and Congressional Power to Abolish the States, 55 CAL. L. R.v. 293 (1967).
78 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
79 384 U.S. at 648.
80 Id.
81 Id. at 651.
82 Id. at 653.
83 360 U.S. 45 (1959).
84 384 U.S. at 649.
85 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 allows Congress to "make all Laws necessary and proper for
carrying into Execution" its article I powers.
86 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 159 (1819).
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the legislative branch from diluting fourteenth amendment rights already estab-
lished by judicial decisions.
The majority tried to dispel Harlan's fears in a footnote where it warned:
Contrary to the suggestion of the dissent, . . . § 5 does not grant Congress
power to exercise discretion in the other direction and to enact "statutes so
as in effect to dilute equal protection and due process decisions of this
Court." We emphasize that Congress' power under § 5 is limited to adopting
measures to enforce the guarantees of the Amendment; § 5 grants Congress
no power to restrict, abrogate, or dilute these guarantees. Thus, for example,
an enactment authorizing the States to establish racially segregated systems
of education would not be-as required by § 5-a measure "to enforce" the
Equal Protection Clause since that clause of its own force prohibits such
state laws.8 7
Nevertheless, Justice Harlan correctly perceived that the tribunal had
placed itself in a compromising position." Despite its progressive leanings, the
Warren Court had created a dilemma which is now being manifested in con-
gressional reliance upon its section five powers to attack the Court. Professor
Cox, while applauding the Morgan decision, best summarized the situation when
he said:
It is hard to see how the Court can consistently give weight to the congres-
sional judgment in expanding the definition of equal protection in the area
of 'human rights but refuse to give it weight in narrowing the definition
where the definition depends upon appraisal of the facts. The [majority's]
footnote, therefore, may not end the argument. 8
The Supreme Court itself has thus provided Congress with a new foothold in
the latest assault upon the courts.
V. The Constitutionality of a Moratorium on Court-ordered Busing
The response to the President's proposals and the Education Amendments
of 1972 has been varied. Some have criticized the congressional legislation as
not only lacking in force90 but prejudicial to the southern states already operating
under court-ordered busing plans."- As a result, it is virtually guaranteed that
87 384 U.S. at 651-52 n.10.
88 A few analysts immediately recognized the prescience of Harlan's dissent. See Bickel,
The Voting Rights Cases, 1966 Sup. Cr. R v. 79, 95 (1966); Comment, Constitutional Law:
Voting Rights-English Literacy Requirement, 20 OKLA. L. Rnv. 189, 190 (1967); Com-
ment, Constitutional Law-1965 Voting Rights Act-§ 4(e) Appropriate to Enforce Equal
Protection, 13 WAYNE L. REv. 435, 437 (1967).
The majority, however, did not. See, e.g., Note, Fourteenth Amendment Enforcement and
Congressional Power to Abolish the States, 55 CAL. L. Rav. 293, 316 (1967); Survey, The
Supreme Court, 1965 Term, 80 HAv. L. REv. 124, 171-2 (1966); Comment, Constitutional
Law-Congressional Power Under the Fifth Section of the Fourteenth Amendment, 41 TUL.
L. Rnv. 120, 125 (1966).
89 Cox, The Supreme Court 1965 Term-Foreword: Constitutional Adjudication and the
Promotion of Human Rights, 80 HIAv. L. Rav. 91, 106 n.86 (1966).
90 See remarks of congressmen quoted at note 5 supra.
91 See, e.g., 118 CONG. REc. 4794 (daily ed. Mar. 24, 1972) (remarks of Senator Gurney);
see also note 5 supra.
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stricter proposals along the Administration lines will be reconsidered.92 Opponents
of the bills, on the other hand, have questioned the constitutionality of any en-
actment which restricts the right of the federal courts to provide the remedy of
busing.9" The remainder of this article will deal specifically with this constitu-
tional question.
Under both the presidential proposal and the congressional enactment,
busing of school children is, at the very minimum, postponed while the legislature
contemplates ways to deal with the busing issue. Such a postponement in effect
suspends the right to an equal education and ignores Supreme Court decisions.
The Supreme Court has clearly established what the Constitution requires
in the area of school desegregation. Prior to 1954 the Court accepted the view
taken in Plessy v. Ferguson94 that "equal but separate" facilities for blacks and
whites were constitutionally valid under the fourteenth amendment. But Brown
v. Board of Education reversed Plessy, antithetically considering separate educa-
tional facilities "inherently unequal" and violative of the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment.99 A year after Brown the Court implemented its
decision96 by charging the inferior federal courts to consider "whether the action
of school authorities constitutes good faith implementation of the governing
constitutional principles,"97 and by calling for desegregation of dual school sys-
tems "with all deliberate speed.""8  After a period of quiescence," the Court
renewed its attack on racial segregation of schools, stating that "no official . . .
plan or provision of which racial segregation is the inevitable consequence may
stand under the Fourteenth Amendment."' By 1964, ten years after the original
Brown decision, "[tihe time for mere 'deliberate speed' [had apparently] run
out, and [the] phrase [could] no longer justify denying . . . children their con-
stitutional rights to an [equal] education... "'n' The Court clearly restated
this view in 1969:
[T]he Court of Appeals should have denied all motions for additional time
because continued operation of segregated schools under a standard of
92 The House Education Subcommittee has already approved the Nixon antibusing bill in
revitalized form despite the congressional enactment of antibusing measures.
93 118 CONG. Rac. 2386 (daily ed. Mar. 22, 1972) (remarks of Representative Abzug);
118 CoNG. RFc. 8284-85 (daily ed. May 23, 1972) (remarks of Senator Wiecker); 118 CONG.
Rac. 8386 (daily ed. May 24, 1972) (remarks of Senator Mondale); id. at 8398 (remarks of
Senator Kennedy); Seymour & Sargentich, The Constitutionality of the Nixon Administration's
Proposed Student Transportation Moratorium Bill, id. at 8387-90; id. at 8375 (remarks of
Senator Javits); 118 CONG. Rac. 8917 (daily ed. June 7, 1972) (remarks of Senator Bayh).
94 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
95 347 U.S. at 495. The Court concluded that:
To separate [children] from others of similar age and qualifications solely because
of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that
may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone. Id. at 494.
96 Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
97 Id. at 299.
98 Id. at 301.
99 Following the congressional assault on the Court in the mid-1950's, the tribunal
retreated in several of the more volatile areas thus quieting congressional criticism and pres-
sure. See note 64 supra. While the Court did not retreat from its decisions in the area of school
desegregation, they did almost completely avoid any decisions in the area until the early 1960's.
100 Goss v. Board of Education, 373 U.S. 683, 689 (1963).
101 Griffin v. School Board, 377 U.S. 218, 234 (1964); accord, Bradley v. School Board,
382 U.S. 103, 105 (1965); Green v. County School Board, 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
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allowing "all deliberate speed" for desegregation is no longer constitutionally
permissible. Under explicit holdings of this Court the obligation of every
school district is to terminate dual school systems at once and to operate now
and hereafter only unitary schools.'1°
One month later it reversed the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal's authorization
of a one-semester delay in full integration 1 3 which, like the current antibusing
legislation, would supposedly have provided time for in-depth studies of pos-
sible solutions.
Two cases are particularly pertinent to this discussion since they deal specif-
ically with student transportation orders. The leading "busing" case, Swann v.
Board of Education,"4 was the Court's attempt "to formulate guideliness" for
implementation of the constitutional commands.0 5 Restating the obligation to
provide remedies "forthwith,"'O' the Court pointed to the broad equity powers
of the inferior federal courts charged with the task of total elimination of state-
imposed segregation*'0 and concluded that:
[There is] no basis for holding that the local school authorities may not be
required to employ bus transportation as one tool of school desegregation.
Desegregation plans cannot be limited to the walk-in school."'
More specifically, the Court stated in Board of Education v. Swann:0 9
[Ain absolute prohibition against transportation of students assigned on the
basis of race... will... hamper the ability of local authorities to effectively
remedy constitutional violations. As noted in Swann, bus transportation
has long been an integral part of all public educational systems, and it is
unlikely that a truly effective remedy could be devised without continued
reliance upon it.110
In insisting upon transportation of students in certain situations, the tribunal
was not unmindful of legitimate concern over "excessive" busing. In order to
avoid the use of transportation remedies where they were not warranted or
desirable, certain criteria were set down. According to the Swann interpretation
of the constitutional mandate, neither exact mathematical ratios nor inflexible
requirements were essential to proper school desegregation. Such devices merely
provide a good starting point in shaping remedies for past constitutional viola-
tions." -' Where the "time or distance of travel is so great as to risk either the
health of the children or significantly impinge on the educational process," an
alternative to busing for desegregation purposes is imperative." 2
102 Alexander v. Board of Education, 396 U.S. 19, 20 (1969).
103 Carter v. West Feliciana School Bd., 396 U.S. 290 (1970).
104 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
105 Id. at 6.
106 Id. at 14.
107 Id. at 15.
108 Id. at 30.
109 402 U.S. 43 (1971).
110 Id. at 46.
Ill 402 U.S. at 24-5.
112 Id. at 30-31.
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Clearly, then, the Education Amendments of 1972 and the legislation pro-
posed by the Administration are in conflict with the decisions of the Supreme
Court as to minimum constitutional criteria for desegregation of schools. The
level of constitutional protection prescribed by these antibusing proposals settles
well below what the Court considers essential. Since the Court is the final
arbiter of the Constitution,11 this antibusing legislation must fall.
The constitutional criteria for desegregation of schools, as set down in the
Supreme Court decisions, may be summarized as follows:
1. Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal and violative
of the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause.
2. Dual school systems must be eliminated immediately - no delay will
be tolerated.
3. Federal courts are empowered with strong equity capabilities and as
such can and should rely upon forced busing of school children for
desegregation purposes where no other remedy will properly enforce the
constitutional guarantees,
4. Except-where the time or distance of travel is such that the chil-
dren's health will be endangered or the educational opportunities stifled,
an alternative remedy must be employed.
Tested against these criteria, the Nixon proposals are deficient in at least
two respects. First, by declaring a national commitment to neighborhood schools
and requesting the use of federal funds to improve inner-city educational facilities,
the President is leading the way back to the "separate but equal" doctrine
denounced in Brown."4 Such a result is inevitable as long as segregated neighbor-
hoods predominate throughout the country."' Children from segregated
neighborhoods, if they are to attend neighborhood schools, will necessarily attend
segregated institutions and the use of federal funds for these facilities will at best
attain physical equality among the various schools. The Equal Educational
Opportunity Act thus ignores a fundamental constitutional maxim-namely,
separate can never be equal.
113 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 87 (1803).
114 Several congressional commentators have viewed the presidential legislation as a return
to "separate but equal." See, e.g., 118 CONG. REc. 4204-06 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 1972) (remarks
of Senator Kennedy); 118 CONG. REc. 2386 (daily ed. Mar. 22, 1972) (remarks of Repre-
sentative Abzug).
115 The Commission on Civil Rights has taken notice of this fact. In a recent response to
the Nixon proposals it concluded:
What Americans must keep in mind, in the furor over the busing debate, is that
to restrict busing in most communities is simply to restrict desegregation. This is so
because of the segregated neighborhoods that exist from coast to coast . . . . [E]ven
with a concerted effort to eliminate well-entrenched patterns of housing segregation,
it would, take generations to undo or even significantly alter them and thus to alter
the educational opportunity of the children who live in segregated neighborhoods near
inferior, segregated neighborhood schools. STATEMENT OF THE UNITED STATES
COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS CONCERNING THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE TO CONGRESS AND
PROPOSED LEGISLATION ON BUSING AND EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITIES, at 8 (1972).
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In a second sense, both the Nixon proposals and the congressional enact-
ments fail to meet the constitutional prerequisites announced by the Supreme
Court. Both are designed to postpone the use of busing as a remedy for racial
segregation. Where busing is the only remedy available, this amounts to a post-
ponement of judicial enforcement of rights defined in the Brown decision. In
light of the Court's requirement of immediate desegregation and its express recog-
nition of student transportation as a means for achieving that objective, the delays
envisioned in any moratorium on busing are constitutionally unacceptable.
But the constitutionality of the proposed antibusing measures may be ques-
tioned on much broader grounds as well. It is the duty of the courts to deter-
mine constitutional requirements with regard to school desegregation. A neces-
sary correlative to that duty is the ability to prescribe and enforce any remedy
which the Court considers necessary. The proposed legislation would eliminate
what may be the only effective remedy in some cases. Such a gross infringement
upon the courts cannot be justified by the limited authorization of article III
and section five of the fourteenth amendment. Unquestionably, Congress can
exercise its article III powers to limit the remedies available to the Court, but
Congress cannot deny the use of all remedies by which a constitutional right
might be protected""' since that would amount to an indirect suspension of the
constitutional right involved. Thus, where busing is the only means of redressing
a constitutional violation, it is not within the legislature's power to deprive the
federal courts of that remedial tool.117
Perhaps the most serious infirmity of the proposed legislation is that it
violates the basic constitutional premise of separation of powers. Separation of
powers was the governmental concept most unanimously accepted by the nation's
founding fathers."1 ' They considered the independence of the judiciary from
both the legislative and executive branches of government as the keystone of a
national philosophy which seeks to uphold both collective security and individual
freedom.1 '
The Supreme Court has fortified its independent status and asserted its
position as ultimate protector and interpreter of the rights guaranteed by the
Constitution. Under the tribunal's interpretation, it not only can, but is required
116 See Hart, supra note 17, at 1366; 118 CoNG. Rac. 4076-78 (daily ed'. April 21, 1972)
(article by Baugher reprinted from Ripon Society's FORUM).
117 118 CoNG. REc. 2880 (daily ed. Mar. 29, 1972) (remarks of Representative Thompson).
118 For example, Madison, after stating that -
[t]he accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same
hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or
elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny
concluded that liberty requires that the three great departments of power should be separate
and distinct. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 301 (Mentor ed. 1961) (J. Madison). Hamilton
was in accord, noting: "[tihe complete independence of the courts of justice is peculiarly essen-
tial in a limited Constitution." Id. No. 78, at 466 (A. Hamilton).
119 A. VANDERBILT, THE DOCTRINE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS AND ITS PRESENT DAY
SIGNIFICANCE 98 (1953). The experience of the colonists with regard to their English con-
stitutional rule made the separation of governmental organs particularly attractive to them.
After living within the grasp of a completely centralized British motherland they were intent
on producing a government free from such executive control of the judiciary. Id. at 50. See
also Ervin, Separation of Powers: Judicial Independence, 35 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 108
(1970). All of the initial state constitutions called for three departments of government and
six specifically established executive, legislative, and judicial branches. Fairlie, The Separa-
tion of Powers, 21 MIcH. L. RIv. 393, 397 (1923).
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to disturb the results of the political process where they are found to be in con-
flict with the Constitution. This procedure is commonly termed "judicial suprem-
acy" and under it, the federal judiciary becomes the guardian of the funda-
mental canons. In other words, "[t]he Constitution and rules deduced from
it are held to be paramount law before which all statutes and public acts .. .
not in accord with its provisions must give way." 121
Justice Marshall first announced the philosophy of "judicial supremacy"
in his classic Marbury v. Madison opinion. 22 Proclaiming that "[i]t is emphat-
ically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is,"
Marshall stated "the constitution controls any legislative act repugnant to it";
and denoting the Constitution as "fundamental and paramount" law, he con-
cluded that Congress cannot alter it by ordinary legislation.2 " Later cases re-
stated the Marshall view and deemed the question of whether congressional en-
actments were within the limits of the legislature's delegated power a judicial
one.1
2 4
Estimating the extent of "judicial supremacy," congressional attempts to
completely prevent the courts from passing upon constitutional questions or
providing remedies for constitutional infringements will surely evince judicially
denoted violations of the constitutional requirement that all judicial power be
vested in the federal courts.2 5 In addition, due process and equal protection
are now considered "inherent in the American concept of free government.'
' 2
They place implied limits on the legislative power and lend themselves to judicial
restrictions upon it. As a result, article III powers and the authority granted by
section five of the fourteenth amendment can only be exercised with due regard
to these cohibitions. While article III empowers Congress to limit the jurisdiction
of the federal courts and section five allows it to enact legislation to enforce the
fourteenth amendment, "that power is circumscribed by the . ..fifth amend-
ment"'2 so that the national legislature cannot exercise those powers in such
a way as to deprive a person of equal protection of the laws.
If the third article bestows plenary power on Congress to control the appel-
late jurisdiction of both inferior federal courts and the Supreme Court, the legis-
lature may constitutionally do either of the following: 1) abolish lower federal
120 See generally W. MENDELSON, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE SUPREME COURT (1959).
121 C. HAINES, THE AMERICAN DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 24 (1959).
122 Marbury, while the first judicial decision proclaiming the courts' supremacy, was based
on rather strong precedent. The records of the Constitutional Convention suggest that a major-
ity of delegates understood the ramifications of a supreme constitutional authority and planned
for the courts to have this power. W. MENDELSON, supra note 120, at 2. Typical of this point
of view was Alexander Hamilton who, in urging ratification of the Constitution, announced:
[C]ourts of justice . . . [have the duty] to declare all acts contrary to the manifest
tenor of the Constitution void . .. [E]very act of a delegated authority, contrary to
the tenor of the commission under which it is exercised, is void. No legislative act,
therefore, contrary to the Constitution, can be valid. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at
466-67 (Mentor ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton).
123 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 111.
124 See, e.g., Dodge v. Woolsey, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 331, 347 (1856); Gordon v. United
States, 117 U.S. 697, 699-701, 705 (1864).
125 Note, Congress vs. Supreme Court-A Constitutional Amendment?, 22 VA. L. REv.
665, 671 (1936).
126 C. HAINES, supra note 121, at 22-23.
127 118 CONG. REC. 2386 (daily ed. Mar. 22, 1972) (remarks of Representative Abzug).
[October, 1972]
[Vol. 48:208]
courts, thereby confining the national judiciary to a single Supreme Court ca-
pable only of exercising original jurisdiction over cases affecting "ambassadors,
other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a state shall be a party";
2) deprive the Supreme Court of appellate jurisdiction over all cases arising
under the United States Constitution, laws, and treaties. Stated differently, if
congressional control over federal jurisdiction is complete, Congress could en-
tirely alter the American governmental structure and all but destroy the judiciary
as a coordinate branch.128
In regard to the busing dispute, the first alternative would be as efficacious
as the second and no need would exist to deprive the Supreme Court of its appel-
late jurisdiction. By denying to inferior federal courts the original power to hear
desegregation disputes, Congress would effectually deny jurisdiction to the Su-
preme Court since no source would exist from which appeals could be brought. 29
The "exceptions and regulations" clause does not, however, extend Con-
gress such far-reaching power and studies of the Constitutional Convention and
ratification debates negate the validity of reliance upon it.' Article VI of the
Constitution makes that document the "supreme law of the land"' -31 and article
III, section 1 coordinately establishes federal tribunals with "nationwide au-
thority to interpret and apply the supreme law." Thus, the federal courts and
the Supreme Court, in particular, are the instruments used to implement article
VI and as such they have the essential constitutional function of providing a
tribunal by which the supreme law will be maintained. 2 Viewed in this light,
the "exceptions and regulations" provisions of article III do not narrow the scope
of the judicial duty to interpret the supreme law, or destroy the courts' essential
role in the constitutional scheme.33 A more reasonable interpretation of the
clause would allow Congress to control the jurisdiction of the federal judiciary
in a manner consistent with the court's constitutional province.'34 The legislature
goes beyond its authorization when it interferes with the exercise of purely judicial
functions and cannot rely upon article III to disguise attempts to regulate civil
rights.' The power to govern jurisdiction is subject to the strictures of the
entire Constitution and Congress cannot bar access to judicial protection where
by doing so it contradicts the very document empowering it to establish "excep-
tions and regulations" in the first place. 6
128 Ratner, supra note 17, at 158.
129 Halper, supra note 17, at 308.
130 At the Constitutional Convention an amendment which would have given Congress
plenary power over the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court was defeated. Thus, the proceedings
confirmed the essential function of the Supreme Court and allowed it "to function at all times
under its constitutional mandate." Ratner, supra note 17, at 172.
The ratification debates in the various states centered almost exclusively around retrial by
the Court of facts already determined by a jury. Nowhere was it mentioned that article III,
section 2 was designed to allow congressional withdrawal of the Court's jurisdiction if such
a withdrawal goes beyond constitutional limits such as the fourteenth amendment. R. BERGER,
CoNGaxss v. THE SUPREME COURT 289 (1969).
131 U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, states, "[t]his Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; . . .shall be the supreme Law of the Land...
132 Ratner, supra note 17, at 160.
133 118 CoNe. REc. 4076-78 (daily ed. April 21, 1972) (article by Baugher reprinted from
Ripon Society's FORUM).
134 Ratner, supra note 17, at 172.
135 Lenoir, supra note 17, at 36.
136 Hart, supra note 17, at 1371.
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It is an established postulate of constitutional government that a tribunal
must always be available to judge constitutional claims.' Ancillary to that is
the requirement that such a tribunal be allowed to fashion the necessary remedies
by which to enforce the fundamental protections. 3 ' The conclusion as to the
busing dispute is therefore axiomatic. Congress can neither deny jurisdiction
to the Supreme Court nor prevent the use of student transportation as a remedy
unless other suitable solutions exist. The legislature is also powerless to deny
the remedy to lower federal courts since this would in effect deprive the Supreme
Court of a proper hearing of desegregation issues and constructively eliminate
tribunals capable of fashioning the necessary remedies.
The Supreme Court article III announcements discussed earlier in this
note, while providing some apparent support for the proposition that Congress
can retract the federal courts' power to order busing, actually provide no basis
whatsoever. Even the concession made by the post-Civil War Court in the
McCardle case is of questionable value to the legislature. While that tribunal
allowed Congress to completely strip it of appellate jurisdiction over habeas
corpus petitions, the language did not sanction "congressional impairment of
the [Supreme Court's] essential constitutional functions,"' 3 9 and anyone viewing
the case as "acknowledging the existence of congressional power to thwart the
Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction through ad hoc legislation" severely mis-
interprets the holding. 4 ° The historical setting of the case is worth noting,'" but
more importantly, other remedies remained available. Circuit Courts of Appeals
were still open to habeas corpus petitions as was the Supreme Court itself where
the petition for the writ was filed with it in the first instance.'42 "The legislation
did no more than eliminate one procedure for Supreme Court review of decisions
denying habeas corpus while leaving another equally efficacious one available,"'
and it is doubtful "whether the McCardle case could command a majority view
today."'144
Not three years after McCardle the Court demonstrated that it had no in-
tention of conceding its power to Congress. While United States v. Klein4 5 was
pending in the Supreme Court Congress withdrew jurisdiction over such actions
as it had in McCardle. However, this time the Court reprimanded the legislature
stating:
[T]his is not an exercise of the acknowledged power of Congress to make
exceptions and prescribe regulations to the appellate power.
We must think that Congress has inadvertently passed the limit which
separates the legislative from the judicial power.
It is of vital importance that these powers be kept distinct' 4
137 Id. at 1372.
138 Id. at 1366.
139 Ratner, s=pra note 17, at 180.
140 Id.
141 See note 43 supra and accompanying ,text.
142 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 515. See also note 136 supra at 1365.
143 Ratner, supra note 17, at 180.
144 Glidden Company v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 605 n.11 (1962) (dissenting opinion).
145 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872).
146 Id. at 146-47.
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The practical ramifications of McCardle and the principle asserted in Klein
preclude any congressional attempts to control the Court's decision in any
particular case by means of jurisdictional limitation, and the Court must there-
fore remain available to ultimately resolve constitutional conflicts induding those
involving segregated schools.
Any reliance upon section five of the fourteenth amendment can be likewise
dismissed despite the decision in Katzenbach v. Morgan. While the Morgan
tribunal placed itself in a vulnerable position by allowing Congress to determine
constitutional requirements prior to a judicial decision, it did not relinquish its
final authority to interpret the meaning of the Constitution as basic law, since
ultimately the Court "alone can place the imprimatur of constitutionality on the
public policies which are tested before its bench." The Court did agree that
Congress had power to act, and in Morgan allowed it to do so in apparent op-
position to the Supreme Court's own Lassiter decision. This fact plus the realiza-
tion that the section five powers of the fourteenth amendment are unclear make
that section the soundest upon which to premise any antibusing legislation 47
Nevertheless, the Morgan decision, separation of powers doctrine, and Constitu-
tion itself preclude such extensive usurpation of power. 4 ' In allowing Congress
to effectually overrule one of its pronouncements, the Court did not thereby
allow the legislature to diminish civil rights. Rather, it permitted protection of
those rights in greater degree than it had previously required and, specifically
noting that enactments allowing states to establish racially segregrated schools
would deny equal protection, made it clear that while greater warrants of pro-
tection might be devised by Congress, in no case could that governmental organ
"restrict, abrogate, or dilute" the guarantees embodied in the fourteenth amend-
ment. 49 Within the constitutional framework, the Court itself must determine
what is necessary to equal protection under the amendment and if its decision is
stricter than that of Congress, the congressional decision must fall since it
necessarily "restrict[s], abrogate[s], and dilute[s]."'" 0 As regards busing of children
for desegregation purposes, the Supreme Court has concluded that under certain
circumstances that remedy must be available if equal protection is to be provided.
The less stringent congressional legislation eliminating or postponing this remedy
must, therefore, fall.
Although Congress must be allowed wide discretion in the discharge of its
duties, according to Marbury v. Madison and the traditional relationship between
the courts and Congress, the legislature has no power to define its own limits."
147 Immediately following the decision, several analysts concluded that the Court's reason-
ing would allow Congress to invoke federal powers in areas traditionally believed beyond con-
gressional power. See, e.g., Comment, Constitutional Law-Congressional Power Under the
Fifth Section of the Fourteenth Amendment, 41 TUL. L. REv. 120 (1966). At least two con-
cluded that the case allowed Congress to regulate public education. Cox, The Supreme Court,
1965 Term-Foreword: Constitutional Adjudication and the Promotion of Human Rights,
supra note 89, at 107-08; Note, Fourteenth Amendment Enforcement and Congressional Power
to Abolish the States, 55 CAL. L. Rtv. 293, 311 (1967).
148 Note, Fourteenth Amendment Enforcement and Congressional Power to Abolish the
States, 55 CAL. L. Rxv. 293, 311 (1967).
149 384 U.S. at 651 n.10.
150 See note 148 supra.
151 Bickel, The Voting Rights Cases, 1966 SuP. CT. REv. 79, 98 (1966).
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That power belongs to the judiciary as the final arbiter of the Constitution and
there is no reason to believe that the courts could or did abandon this function
in either the Morgan or McCardle case.
VI. Conclusion
Senator Ervin, in a recent article, envisioned the nation as one burdening
under "an aura of crisis." '152 Seeking to rectify situations which we unwittingly
consider disastrous, Americans have threatened the principle of an independent
judiciary by invoking a "crisis" approach to solving problems." The current
busing furor attests to this view. The prospect of an integrated society has
frightened many into calling upon their national legislators to take measures
which would not only sharply restrict a coordinate branch of government and
undermine the integrity of the federal judiciary, but would "cost [the nation]
another whole generation of badly educated minority children, denied their con-
stitutional rights to equal educational opportunity."' 5 4
The antibusing legislation will almost certainly reach the Supreme Court
where its constitutionality will be finally determined. The Court should declare
the Education Amendments and any measures enacted pursuant to the Admin-
istration's recommendations unconstitutional. These enactments not only con-
travene the tribunal's requirement of immediate desegregation of dual school
systems, but they are an abuse of the article III and fourteenth amendment
powers of Congress and a violation of the principle of separation of powers.
They are also antagonistic to the overall scheme of the Constitution which re-
quires that federal courts always be available to hear and provide remedies for
constitutional disputes. In regard to busing, therefore, it would be improper to
deny either jurisdiction or an essential remedy to the federal tribunals.
Whether the Court will declare the measures void is another matter.
Congress has presented the Court with an awesome choice between accepting "a
severe limitation on its authority to endorse the 14th amendment or of declaring
a law unconstitutional in the face of a highly emotional electorate."' 5 5 If the
,Court so lacks public support as to be unable to avoid congressional action, it may
be difficult to reclaim the public's favor merely by exerting its will." 6 President
Roosevelt through his "court-packing" legislation and Senator Jenner by means
of his 1957 bill focused political attention on the federal courts and thus im-
pelled a change in judicial attitude . 7 By moderating its stand the Supreme Court
was able to emerge from both attacks with its constitutional status unimpaired.'58
152 Ervin, Separation of Powers: Judicial Independence, 35 LAw & CONTEMP. PRoB. 108,
121 (1970).
153 Id. at 122.
154 STATEMENT OF THE UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS CONCERNING THE
PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE TO CONGRESS AND PROPOSED LEGISLATION ON BUSING AND EQUAL
EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITIES, at 8 (1972).
155 118 CONG. REC. 4304-06 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 1972) (remarks of Senator Kennedy).
156 See Halper, supra note 17, at 324.
157 R. HIRSCHFIELD, supra note 7, at 24.
158 The Court has already begun to retreat somewhat. In a recent 5-4 decision it barred
splintering of school districts into smaller ones where the result is to perpetuate racial segrega-
tion. While the result is not inconsistent with past decisions, it is the first decision in the area
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In the present dispute it is likely that the Court's course of action will follow
the historical example. While the Administration's proposal extends far beyond
what the Court should allow, the congressional proposals deny rights to a lesser
degree. The Court, as a result, will in all probability uphold the Education
Amendments of 1972 and attempt to provide unequivocal guidelines as soon as
possible.
"LThe strongest safeguard against the exercise of tyrannical power by men
who want to live about the law, rather than under it" is an independent judi-
ciary." 9 When the founding fathers embodied the separation of powers concept
within the Constitution they assumed the existence "of a judicial system free from
outside influence of whatever kind and from whatever source."1 "0 They recognized
that the public officers were accountable to the law as were the constituents and
that "liberty demands control by constant and uniformly enforced laws rather
than by the arbitrary and inconstant whims of wilfull men."'"- Surely none of
the framers thought that the form of government they were implementing would
create a federal judiciary "composed of judicial angels who could do no
wrong."' 2 They knew that some judges would handicap the system's operation;
nevertheless, all conceded that individual liberty would best be protected by an
independent group of tribunals accountable to the Constitution alone. Their
wisdom must not be rejected or our own freedom destroyed by rearranging
the Constitution "to suit the whims of individual men."'0 3
Jon R. Pozgay
not supported by a unanimous vote. Wright v. Council of the City of Emporia, 40 U.S.L.W.
4806 (June 22, 1972).
159 Ervin, supra note 152, at 121.
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